By David E Kiwuwa*
Cameroonians go to the polls in October 2025 in what some people hoped might be a break from the country’s troubled recent past. They thought that President Paul Biya (92) might stand aside to allow a transition.
Three years ago I was one of those who expressed optimism about the 2025 poll. But I was wrong.
Biya is set to run yet again for an 8th term. He is already one of Africa’s longest ruling presidents, behind only Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Nguema.
Biya is on the cusp of achieving lifetime presidency since taking office in 1982.
In July 2025, after months of speculation, he confirmed in a tweet that he would run again.
Having weathered coups, silenced dissent, defied death rumours, and outlasted generations of challengers, he reminded friend and foe alike that he remains at the centre of Cameroon’s political ecosystem.
I am a long time scholar of and commentator on African politics, regime transformation, democratic transition and broader governance. Given regional developments that have seen the military deposing long term leaders, one might expect Biya to superintend a managed transition. The intriguing question is: what is it about the situation in Cameroon that continues to defy logic?
There is evident restlessness and frustration among young Cameroonians as well as clear clamour for change. Yet, the incumbent remains the front-runner, supported by the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, and his near-total command of the state’s political machinery.
Simply, the system has been designed to serve Biya’s interests. With government control of the media, resources, and judicial and electoral institutions, it is unlikely that the opposition can bring about systemic change.
Some things have changed, however. Biya’s previous wins were landslides that left no room for debate. This time things could potentially be different on account of high-profile defections from his party. These men will be challenging him at the polls.
The field
The last electoral cycle, leading up to the 2018 poll, was characterised by subdued challenges and a co-opted or deeply divided opposition. This time Biya appears to face a relatively organised opposition.
Initially, 83 candidates signalled their interest. In July the electoral commission cleared 13 to run. The commission controversially disqualified Maurice Kamto, a renowned legal scholar who performed respectably in the 2018 electoral cycle with 14% of the vote.
Human Rights Watch warned that this would cast a shadow over the credibility of the electoral process.
Nevertheless, several credible figures across the political spectrum remain in the race and present alternatives.
Biya faces two other former allies turned political adversaries.
One is Issa Tchiroma Bakary, his minister of employment and vocational training. A longtime insider of the regime, he served in various ministerial roles and was long considered a loyalist. Yet in June 2025, he resigned from the government, delivering a searing critique of the system he once represented.
He then launched his campaign, running on the ticket of the Front for the National Salvation of Cameroon.
The minister of tourism and leisure, Bello Bouba Maigari, still formally holding office, declared his intention in July 2025 to run against his boss in the October elections.
This announcement was especially striking given the deep political history between the two men. Maigari is not just any cabinet member. He is a long-standing confidant of the president, having been appointed Biya’s prime minister in 1982 and hailing from the vote-rich northern region. The decision to enter the race marks a shift from loyal lieutenant to presidential challenger, revealing the growing fissures within the ruling elite.
Others in the race worth noting are:
- Akere Muna, a former speaker who swore in Biya in 1982 and a tireless advocate for transparency and accountability. He ran for the top job in 2018 (but withdrew at the last minute).
- Cabral Libii, from the Cameroon Party for National Reconciliation, a young and dynamic leader who also ran for president in 2018 and garnered 6% of the total vote.
- Joshua Osih, a seasoned politician with a strong track record.
The issues
The nation’s pressing issues remain the same as they have been for a long while.
These include:
- Endemic corruption. Cameroon is ranked 140 out of 180 countries by Transparency International. The reasons are systemic decay of state institutions and maladministration.
- Economic stasis, including stubborn unemployment forecast at 7.34% by Statista; 23% live below the international poverty line and 3.3 million are food insecure.
- The ongoing anglophone regional crisis pitting the English speaking regions against the dominant francophone centre.
- Biya’s ability to govern and the succession question, given his very advanced age and the potential vacuum or infighting if he couldn’t complete his term.
The external dimension
Western actors have been consistent critics of Biya’s regime in the recent past. However, some have adopted a more cautious tone, balancing criticism with strategic interests.
The US, for instance, suspended some military assistance to Cameroon in 2019 over human rights abuses. But it continues counter-terrorism cooperation against Boko Haram.
The European Union, while pressing for peaceful resolution of the anglophone conflict, remains an important trade and aid partner.
China has become Cameroon’s largest bilateral creditor and a top trading partner. According to a report by Business in Cameroon, in 2024 Cameroon owed about 64.8% of its external bilateral debt to China. This is primarily for infrastructure loans that have funded projects like the Kribi Deep Sea Port, the Yaoundé-Douala highway, and hydropower stations.
For regime survival, Biya has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy. Beijing’s diplomatic stance of non-interference and respect for sovereignty resonates with Cameroonian political elites wary of western scrutiny and criticism over democratic backsliding and the anglophone conflict.
But Biya has not severed ties with the west. For example, the government maintains partnerships with France for security training, with Germany for decentralisation support, and with the US for counterinsurgency.
This balancing is not simply geopolitical. It is also deeply embedded in domestic patronage networks. Foreign aid, loans and investments serve as resources to consolidate elite power, strengthen the patronage system and suppress dissent.
The October polls are sure to reaffirm the status quo.
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* Associate Professor of International Studies, University of Nottingham
