Chad After Elections: Challenges and Hopes for the Future

For one reason or another, Chad, an oil-exporting country of nearly 18 million people, hadn’t had a free-and-fair transfer of power since it became independent in 1960 after decades of French colonial rule, before the 2024 election. But U.S. and French officials have been accused of turning a blind eye, as Chad has become a vital security and humanitarian partner. Besides, the ruling party, the Patriotic Salvation Movement, has served as a vessel for clientelism that linked elites to the former regime. A similar picture is apparent within the security sector, where senior leaders are loyal to people in power rather than the state. An analyst says Chad continues to suffer from years of civil conflict, political instability, and economic mismanagement. Yet, Chad is seen by the U.S. and France as one of the last remaining stable allies in the vast Sahel region following military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in recent years. As the ruling juntas in all three nations have expelled French forces and turned to Russia’s mercenary units for security assistance instead,.

The political status quo

Chad leader Mahamat Déby Itno came to power in a coup in April 2021 following the death of his father, President Idriss Déby. Sadly, the elder Déby died in a battle with one of several armed rebellions against his 31-year-long autocratic rule. In accordance with the constitution, the president of the National Assembly ought to have assumed power as interim head of state, organizing elections within 90 days to elect a new president. Instead, a group of military officers took power and proclaimed Mahamat Déby acting head of state, dissolved Chad’s political institutions, and suspended the constitution. But at least the African Union (AU) did not suspend Chad from its activities, departing from the usual practice of punishing coup plotters. The conclusions of the inclusive and sovereign National Dialogue, held between August and October 2022, extended the political transition by two years. General Mahamat Déby was sworn in as President of the Transition on October 10 and set up a government of national unity on October 14. On October 20, the opposition protested against the extension of the transition period, although the transitional president was allowed to stand for election. The bloody demonstrations resulted in 128 deaths, according to estimates by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) of Chad.

Nevertheless, on August 8, the transitional military council and more than 40 rebel groups signed a peace accord in Doha, Qatar, to end a decades-long conflict and initiate a broader national dialogue. The accord was welcomed by the United Nations and the African Union Commission chief, Moussa Faki Mahamat. However, nine armed factions, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad—FACT), the Libya-based group whose fighting led to the death of the former president in April 2021, rejected the deal, saying it did not consider their demands. In November 2023, leading opposition figure Succès Masra returned to Chad from a yearlong exile through an internationally mediated arrangement with the government. He had fled the country in the aftermath of the crackdown and repression of protests in October 2022. On December 24, 2022, the transitional government granted amnesty to nearly 300 rebels and political dissidents. Masra’s return constitutes a source for possible optimism with respect to political space, participation, and consensus building ahead of the 2024 elections. A Harvard and Oxford-educated economist, Masra was the strongest opposition figure until his appointment in January 2024.

The younger Déby promised a return to civilian rule as well as elections, but the leader extended the transition for two years, despite loud objections from opposition parties. A constitutional referendum on a new constitution will be held on December 17, 2023. The Chadians voted “yes” to new measures such as the creation of local councils to devolve power from the center, a presidential term limit reduced from six to five years, and a reduced age limit from 40 to 35 years, as well as the strengthening of the electoral agency by making it independent of the government. The new constitution was approved by 86%, with a 63.75% turnout, but opposition leaders disputed the figures. It demanded the creation of two electoral institutions before the electoral process. Namely, L’Agence nationale de gestion des élections (National Election Management Agency) and the Constitutional Council. Still, civil society and opposition leaders have criticized the referendum process for its lack of inclusiveness and failure to consider key concerns of the political opposition, such as intimidation, lack of freedom of speech and assembly, a partisan electoral management body, and consideration of decentralizing authority in the fifth largest country by land area in Africa. Substantively, the opposition has long advocated for a transition to a federal system as a means of diffusing power among local authorities in this expansive country. The issue received considerable attention during the DNIS, resulting in a resolution that the question of whether to shift to a federal system would be included in a referendum. Despite this, the December 17 referendum does not address the federalism issue. Rather, it solely asks voters to accept or reject the draft constitution, which specifies a unitary state.

During the election process, as expected, the most prominent qualified candidates were Mahamat Déby and his prime minister, Masra. It was the first time a president and the prime minister he appointed ran against each other in a Chadian election. The other candidates are: Albert Pahimi Padacke (RNDT-Le Reveil party or the National Rally of Chadian Democrats), Alladoum Djarma Baltazar (Chadian Socialist Action Party for Renewal or Action pour le renouveau du Tchad [ASTRE]), Theophile Bongoro Bebzoune (Party for the Rally and Equity in Chad or Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès [PRET]), Lydie Beassemda, (Party for Democracy and Independence or Parti pour la drmocratie et l’independance integrals), Mansiri Lopsekreo (Elites party (Les Élites), Brice Mbaimon Guedmbaye (Movement of Chadian Patriots for the Republic or Mouvement des patriotes tchadiens pour la Republique [MPTR]), Yacine Abdermane Sakine (Reformist Party (Parti Reformiste), Nasra Djimasngar (New Day [Un Jour Nouvel] party).

On May 6, 2024, Chad held its long-delayed presidential election following three years of military rule. In the end, Chad’s military leader, Mahamat Déby Itno, was declared the winner of the presidential election. The results were contested by his main rival, Prime Minister Succès Masra. Masra challenged the incumbent under the Transformers Party (Les Transformateurs). According to the official result from Chad’s National Elections Management Agency, the figures showed Deby Itno won with just over 61% of the vote, with the runner-up Masra falling far behind with over 18.5% of the vote. Gunfire erupted in the capital following the announcement, though it was unclear if it was celebratory. Although a report said preliminary results were initially expected on May 21,.

Though civil society groups, opposition members, and some election observers condemned violence and fraud in the election, there were also allegations of ballot-box stuffing. Just before the event, Masra claimed victory in a live broadcast on Facebook and called on security forces and his supporters to oppose what he called an attempt to steal the vote. The disputed results cap a fraught electoral period marked by the killing of opposition figure Yaya Dillo Djerou, the rejection of prominent opposition figures from the candidate list, and other issues that critics say have compromised the credibility of the process. Chadian authorities have rejected the accusations against them, saying Dillo “opposed his arrest” and fired on security forces. The unrest underscores the increasingly tense atmosphere in Chad, where the legitimacy of the military-led transition has come under scrutiny. The announcement of a civilian-led transitional government has failed to quell anger. Yet, Chad’s election is a milestone for countries in West and Central Africa that have fallen under military rule since a spate of coups began in 2020.

The struggle to bring peace

There is no doubt that Chad is also surrounded by conflicts with neighboring countries. Conflict dynamics in these neighboring countries exacerbate internal crises in Chad, making the conflict-prone country vulnerable to both national and regional instabilities. In a region mired by significant instability—from a wave of coups d’états in the Sahel and war in Sudan to insecurity in the Central African Republic and state failure in Libya to the malign effects of great-power competition, including Russian and Chinese misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation aimed at undermining Western powers’ influence—it is essential to preserve and sustain peace and security in Chad. It is equally significant to recognize the lessons and challenges Chad’s political transition may offer other countries in the region. Chad’s army, reputed to be among the best in the region, commands influence across the troubled Sahel, where armed group incursions and a wave of coups have created regional rifts and diminished the standing of Western powers like France and the United States. In the Sahel, Chad has been providing substantial military contributions to regional counterterrorism operations for years.

Chad has long been in the grip of political tensions arising from shifting allegiances and family and tribal relations within the political elite. Uncertainty following the death of longtime ruler Idriss Deby in 2021 and the installation of his son Mahamat as leader have escalated the problems. The Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), which emerged in 2006 under the leadership of Mahamat Nouri, was one of the largest Chadian rebel groups. In 2006, the UFDD led an unsuccessful offensive to Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, in order to overthrow the government. The Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) is another alliance of rebel groups founded in 2009 and led by Timane Erdini. It receives strong support from the Zaghawa people (their estimated 4000 members consist mainly of Zaghawa fighters) and maintains close ties with Darfuri groups like the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The UFR tried to overthrow the government in 2019, but the attempted coup was aborted following French intervention. Several other Chadian rebel groups, such as the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR), founded in 2016, equally seek to overthrow the government of President Déby.

Meanwhile, Chad’s army, reputed to be among the best in the region, commands influence across the troubled Sahel, where armed group incursions and a wave of coups have created regional rifts and diminished the standing of Western powers like France and the United States. In the interim, Chad is home to a French military base where counter-terrorism operations for the Sahel region are headquartered. It’s hosting hundreds of French troops after they were kicked out of neighboring Niger, and some American ones. But some American troops are leaving after a letter from Chad’s Air Force chief ordered them to stop activities on an air base in the capital, Ndjamena, U.S. officials said recently—at least until after the election. Conversely, the actions of Mahamat Idriss Déby against Boko Haram and Libyan-based insurgents, as well as his co-option of large parts of his father’s power network, are likely to stem violent attempts to overthrow the current political settlement. Security and the economy have been key campaign issues.

Is Chad moving onward?

Chad has been in a state of almost constant instability and protracted conflict since achieving independence in 1960. Against that backdrop, the central African country sees it as the key to security in a troubled region. A genuine national dialogue would provide an opportunity to envision a military outside of the political process. This would allow the military to focus on addressing the serious security threats confronting the country. A civilian government would also open Chad up to expand private investment, development assistance, and security cooperation. All of these would improve the overall defense readiness and effectiveness of the security sector.

In the same way, an inclusive civilian-led transition with buy-in from all political actors may also reduce the ongoing internal conflicts that have destabilized Chad for years. While experts are of the opinion that the sustainable way forward will be to foster political inclusion and enable civic space and meaningful policy debate focused on underlying sources of tension—notably at the provincial and local level—and the need for inclusion, representation, and participation of marginalized Chadian voices in decision-making, In addition to that, the government of Chad, as per Article 3(f) of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU PSC) Protocol, should ensure that security operations aimed at preserving national stability are conducted with full respect to international and regional laws to which it is a signatory.