By Kristof Titeca*
A series of peace initiatives since 2021 have sought to address the escalation of conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following a renewed offensive from the M23 rebel group.
The origins of this crisis go back to the First Congo War in 1996. Since then, the intensity of conflict in eastern DRC has ebbed and surged. The current M23 offensive represents one of its most violent phases.
Over nearly three decades, numerous peace efforts have been undertaken, yet neither local, regional nor international interventions have succeeded in bringing lasting stability. Crucially, they have failed to tackle the broader dynamics that perpetuate violence in the country’s mineral-rich east, where at least 120 armed groups are estimated to be active.
These recent efforts include the Nairobi process launched in April 2022 by the East African Community, and the Luanda process in June of the same year, launched by Angolan president João Lourenço.
The East African Community deployed its regional force to the DRC in November 2022. This was followed by the Southern African Development Community deploying troops in December 2023. These troops withdrew in 2023 and 2025, respectively.
More recently, there have been peace talks in Doha, which started after a meeting between the presidents of Congo and Rwanda in March 2025. The US mediated in Washington from April 2025.
The conflict has continued to escalate. More than 7.8 million people are now internally displaced in eastern DRC. Another 28 million people are facing food insecurity, including nearly four million at emergency levels.
Why have peace processes failed to deliver stability, and what could be done to strengthen them?
I have studied the dynamics of conflict in central Africa for decades, and in my view, the persistence of conflict in DRC’s eastern region isn’t due to a lack of peace initiatives. I argue that some initiatives suffer from flawed design, others from difficult implementation, and some from a combination of both.
Deep mistrust, stalled commitments, the exclusion of key actors, fragmented mediation efforts, an overemphasis on economic incentives, and weak domestic legitimacy have all undermined progress.
Ideally, peace processes would address these shortcomings comprehensively and lay the foundations for lasting stability.
But ideal conditions rarely exist.
The challenge, therefore, is to use sustained diplomacy to make the current imperfect frameworks work more effectively, while gradually building the trust and inclusivity needed for more durable peace.
What’s gone wrong
1. Deep mistrust between the parties
Peace processes since 2021 have focused on negotiating peace between the DRC government, M23 representatives (and their political wing Alliance Fleuve Congo) and the Rwandan government. The UN and many others have shown that Rwanda has been supporting the M23, a claim Kigali repeatedly denies.
At the heart of the failures of these processes lies a profound lack of trust. Relations between Kinshasa, M23 and Kigali are marked by hostility, mutual suspicion and broken promises.
Moreover, M23, Alliance Fleuve Congo and Rwanda cannot be treated as interchangeable actors. Among these actors, differences remain over the ultimate objectives of the rebellion – whether to march on Kinshasa, secure control over key territories in the east, or build influence through Congolese state structures versus a de facto separate administration.
Continued atrocities on the ground reinforce distrust. Recent reports from the UN, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International document continued killings and summary executions of Congolese civilians by M23 rebels with Rwandan backing, raising concerns of ethnic cleansing. These have happened alongside abuses by Congolese forces and allied militias (grouped as Wazalendo).
2. Poor implementation measures
Because of this mistrust, parties are reluctant to take the first step in implementing agreements. The 19 July 2025 Doha Declaration of Principles, for example, committed both sides to prisoner exchanges and the restoration of state authority in rebel-held zones. Yet, Kinshasa refused to exchange prisoners before a final settlement, a condition M23 saw as essential.
3. Failing to include all regional actors
The war in eastern DRC involves multiple neighbouring states. Uganda, in particular, has a significant military presence and shares Rwanda’s concerns and motivations: both see the area as a security threat and an economic opportunity, especially through gold exports and cross-border trade. Yet, Uganda has been excluded from some negotiations.
In early August 2025, African states announced they would merge mediation structures by the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union into one solidified process led by the African Union. This could potentially bring in these regional actors, particularly Uganda.
4. Duplication and fragmentation of initiatives
A recurring problem since the renewed outbreak of conflict in 2021 has been the proliferation of parallel and overlapping peace initiatives, involving different actors, and not necessarily bringing coherence.
5. The role and limits of external pressure
The success of negotiations to some extent depends on how much diplomatic bandwidth the mediating actors want to spend.
In the current context, US pressure is key. And indeed, in light of renewed fighting in mid-August 2025, the US has released a number of statements and sanctions against the parties involved – mostly M23. Yet, expectations of heavy-handed US intervention, including the unrealistic notion of American “boots on the ground”, have created disappointment among a number of actors, particularly in the DRC.
6. Economic incentives alone are insufficient
The Washington process placed heavy emphasis on promoting trade with the US, presenting economic growth as a pathway to stability. But peace requires more than economic deals. This approach risks reducing a multidimensional conflict – rooted in political, security and social grievances – to a question of markets. This risks prioritising US economic interests rather than addressing local realities.
7. Weak internal legitimacy
Finally, the legitimacy of the current peace deals within the DRC remains contested. The intensifying conflict has coincided with mounting domestic criticism of President Felix Tshisekedi, whose authority was undermined by his inability to resolve the violence. Agreements have been criticised by Congolese civil society as externally driven and insufficiently inclusive. They have not been ratified by parliament nor have they involved civil society or grassroots actors.
What needs to change?
Eastern DRC remains mired in conflict despite peace initiatives. Broken promises, weak implementation, and deep mistrust keep progress at bay. Economic incentives alone can’t solve a crisis rooted in politics, security and social grievances.
Outside powers can only apply leverage. Durable peace must be negotiated and owned by the parties themselves. And without broader buy-in, peace processes risk functioning merely as cooling-off mechanisms, not genuine pathways toward resolution.
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* Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp
