{"id":18978,"date":"2025-12-22T13:04:17","date_gmt":"2025-12-22T13:04:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/?p=18978"},"modified":"2025-12-22T13:04:17","modified_gmt":"2025-12-22T13:04:17","slug":"cameroon-and-tanzanias-rulers-clung-to-power-in-2025-but-look-more-vulnerable-than-ever","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/18978\/cameroon-and-tanzanias-rulers-clung-to-power-in-2025-but-look-more-vulnerable-than-ever\/","title":{"rendered":"Cameroon and Tanzania’s rulers clung to power in 2025\u2014but look more vulnerable than\u00a0ever"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Yonatan Morse<\/a>*<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Autocratic leaders in Africa like their numbers to be in the high 90s, it appears.<\/p>\n

In October, Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan won a\u00a0highly dubious 98% of the presidential vote<\/a>, perpetuating the ruling party\u2019s grip on power to 60 years. During the same month, Cameroonian President Paul Biya, who has ruled the country since 1982, secured an\u00a0unprecedented eighth term in office<\/a>. It will allow him to serve until he turns 99.<\/p>\n

In neither\u00a0case were elections deemed free<\/a>\u00a0or\u00a0fair<\/a>, and in\u00a0both cases protests<\/a>\u00a0and severe\u00a0government crackdowns<\/a>\u00a0followed.<\/p>\n

Yet, while the outcome was ultimately the survival of incumbent governments, these elections are quite telling about the changing fortunes of autocracy in Africa.<\/p>\n

In 2019, I wrote a book titled \u201cHow Autocrats Compete<\/a>\u201d that used Tanzania and Cameroon as contrasting examples. The divergent origins of their respective autocracies sowed the seeds for the kinds of challenges that each country would eventually face. Both country\u2019s governments,\u00a0which observers<\/a>\u00a0widely see<\/a>\u00a0as repressive<\/a>\u00a0and antidemocratic<\/a>, have lost key sources of underlying strength, making them more vulnerable than they have been in decades.<\/p>\n

The roots of 2 autocracies<\/h3>\n

\u201cHow Autocrats Compete\u201d showed how Tanzania and Cameroon used to reflect two different strains of autocracy: party-based and a personalist.<\/p>\n

For decades, Julius Nyerere was the driving force in Tanzanian politics. An immensely popular anti-colonial leader, Nyerere in 1965 created a single-party state governed by a robust and effective political party apparatus \u2013 first under the Tanganyika African National Union and later recast as Chama Cha Mapinduzi, or CCM.<\/p>\n

The party attracted a wide swath of rural voters, had national functioning institutions and a widespread grassroots presence. Importantly, when Nyerere stepped down from power in 1985 \u2013 then a precedent in African politics \u2013 he established an internal primary system to select CCM\u2019s future presidential candidates.<\/p>\n

Cameroon\u2019s autocracy emerged from much different terrain. After independence, political power was heavily centralized in the presidency. The main source of power was the president\u2019s ability to use carrots and sticks to bring together a multiethnic coalition of elites into a transactional relationship.<\/p>\n

By 1972, all political parties had been absorbed by the ruling Cameroonian National Union, later known as the Cameroon People\u2019s Democratic Movement.<\/p>\n

The ruling party played a secondary role compared to the presidency, withering away and not even meeting for years. Under Cameroon\u2019s first president, Ahamdou Ahidjo, power was oriented to the north of the country, while under Paul Biya it has been oriented to the south.<\/p>\n

These different foundations for autocracy translated into unique adaptations to multiparty elections. In Tanzania, the ruling CCM could rely on widespread turnout, and the candidate selection processes appeared to minimize elite discontent within the party.<\/p>\n

Between 1995 and 2010, CCM and its presidential candidates could win determinative vote shares while minimizing costly repression and fraud.<\/p>\n

Elections were\u00a0still not free and fair<\/a>, but there were not systematically high rates of violence or coercion. In fact, at the time many considered\u00a0Tanzania somewhat of a democracy<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The same could not be said of Cameroon, where elections were initially much more challenging for the ruling party and President Biya.<\/p>\n

In the 1990s, the ruling CPDM suffered a\u00a0barrage of defections<\/a>\u00a0and Biya\u00a0won only 40% of the 1992 election<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But, largely shielded from international scrutiny, he could deploy highly repressive tools that allowed him to build an image of invulnerability. Former opponents rejoined the CPDM, and the opposition wilted away to an enclave in majority Francophone Cameroon\u2019s English-speaking regions. At the core remained Biya, with virtual control over all political and economic life.<\/p>\n

The erosion of hegemony in Tanzania<\/h3>\n

When I wrote \u201cHow Autocrats Compete,\u201d I argued that CCM\u2019s core strengths in Tanzania would ultimately erode. As younger generations became removed from the mythology of Nyerere, CCM\u2019s voting constituency would diminish.<\/p>\n

And indeed, according to\u00a0Afrobarometer<\/a>, the percentage of Tanzanians who felt close to CCM declined from 91% in 2001 to 69% in 2012.<\/p>\n

CCM\u2019s advantages as a ruling party also incentivized opposition parties to emulate it. There is\u00a0extensive<\/a>\u00a0research<\/a>\u00a0on how the main Tanzanian opposition party Chadema mimicked CCM\u2019s grassroots approach to party building.<\/p>\n

These changes were accompanied by increased factionalism within CCM. The key moment was the 2015 election when front-runner presidential candidate\u00a0Edward Lowassa was disqualified<\/a> and John Magufuli nominated instead. Magufuli, seen as an institutional choice, had no strong ties to any specific faction, and thus a tenuous grasp over the party elite.<\/p>\n

The answer to all of these challenges has been for the ruling party to crack down on opposition and impose discipline. Since 2015, Tanzania has become a demonstrably less open place, ratcheting up the brutality\u00a0against opposition<\/a>\u00a0elites<\/a>\u00a0and civil society writ large.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, to control its own elite, CCM has had to\u00a0restrict its ability to maneuver<\/a>. Despite promises of reform and conciliatory gestures, Hassan appears driven by the same political logic \u2013 the party cannot lose and can no longer rely on the tools of the past. The only way to secure victory is through much more overt repression.<\/p>\n

The limits of personal rule in Cameroon<\/h3>\n

The personalized nature of the Cameroonian government has made the question of succession a perennial puzzle.<\/p>\n

Absent any credible mechanism for choosing a successor, Biya\u2019s solution has been to kick the can down the road. In 2008, despite public discontent, he\u00a0controversially removed term limits<\/a>, seemingly signaling his willingness to stay in office indefinitely.<\/p>\n

But Biya\u2019s ability to hold together the historic multiethnic coalition has appeared severely weakened in recent years.<\/p>\n

Cameroon\u2019s English-speaking regions, representing nearly a quarter of the population, grew more vocal in their demands for equality in Cameroon\u2019s heavily centralized political system. The government\u2019s response has been violent, and since 2017 these regions have been mired in a\u00a0civil conflict<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Biya has also faced growing opposition from the the wing of his coalition representing the Bamilek\u00e9, an important ethnic group that has largely remained within the ruling fold. Since 2012, when one of its leaders, Maurice Kamto, defected to challenge Biya, the government has routinely responded by arresting\u00a0the opposition figure<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0many of his supporters<\/a>.<\/p>\n

These factors, along with growing impatience over the question of succession, likely influenced the decision of the northern-based leader\u00a0Issa Tchiroma to leave government<\/a>\u00a0and challenge Biya in the 2025 election. The north-south coalition had been the most important axis of Biya\u2019s coalition.<\/p>\n

Given the size and importance of the northern bloc, overt repression of Tchiroma was much riskier for Biya. He could not simply disallow Tchiroma\u2019s candidacy as\u00a0he had done for Maurice Kamto<\/a>.<\/p>\n

So Biya\u2019s government\u00a0rigged the results<\/a>.<\/p>\n

To raise the costs of fraud, Tchiroma declared himself the winner immediately after the election. Cameroon\u2019s election management body took a painstaking 15 days to declare Biya the victor with\u00a0just 54% of the vote<\/a>, his lowest showing since 1992. Given the obvious factionalism and Biya\u2019s weakness, it would have been inconceivable to claim any larger of a victory.<\/p>\n

The shifting tides of authoritarianism<\/h3>\n

While each election might have been a victory for autocracy, these are different autocracies from what they were 20 years ago. Importantly, the electoral contests tell us that authoritarian governments are dynamic \u2013 and even potentially at risk.<\/p>\n

In the case of Tanzania, there has been a gradual unwinding of key sources of longevity in favor of more blatant and brutal tools of authoritarian rule. Hassan vote share is a reminder of sham results seen in places like\u00a0Equatorial Guinea<\/a>\u00a0or\u00a0Rwanda<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, in Cameroon we are witnessing the logical unfolding of a highly personalized autocracy that has been unwilling to deal with its own internal contradictions. In both 2025 and 1992, Biya faced a frayed political coalition that sensed his vulnerability. The difference this time is that Biya does not have another 30 years ahead of him to rebuild a political coalition.<\/p>\n

At the end of the day, these are autocracies in transition and entering into a new status quo that seems much more fragile. It is unclear what new equilibriums will emerge.<\/p>\n

\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640\u0640<\/p>\n

* Associate Professor, University of Connecticut.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In October, Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan won a\u00a0highly dubious 98% of the presidential vote, perpetuating the ruling party\u2019s grip on power to 60 years. During the same month, Cameroonian President Paul Biya, who has ruled the country since 1982, secured an\u00a0unprecedented eighth term in office. It will allow him to serve until he turns 99.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":18556,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"iawp_total_views":1,"jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"format":"standard","override":[{"template":"1","parallax":"1","fullscreen":"1","layout":"right-sidebar","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"top","share_float_style":"share-monocrhome","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_reading_time":"0","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","post_calculate_word_method":"str_word_count","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_comment_section":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_post_related":"1","show_inline_post_related":"1"}],"image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","disable_ad":"0","source_name":"The Conversation","source_url":"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/autocracies-in-transition-in-2025-cameroon-and-tanzania-rulers-clung-to-power-but-look-more-vulnerable-than-ever-270718","subtitle":""},"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":{"view_counter_number":"0","share_counter_number":"0","like_counter_number":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"footnotes":""},"categories":[28,29,2362,35],"tags":[193,1503,505,131],"class_list":["post-18978","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-central-africa","category-east-africa","category-featured","category-ana-politics","tag-cameroon","tag-paul-biya","tag-samia-suluhu-hassan","tag-tanzania"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18978","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=18978"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18978\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":18979,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18978\/revisions\/18979"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/18556"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=18978"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=18978"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=18978"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}