{"id":10932,"date":"2024-02-25T14:06:22","date_gmt":"2024-02-25T14:06:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/?p=10932"},"modified":"2024-02-25T14:06:22","modified_gmt":"2024-02-25T14:06:22","slug":"free-movement-in-west-africa-three-nations-quitting-ecowas-may-confront-migration-challenges","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/10932\/free-movement-in-west-africa-three-nations-quitting-ecowas-may-confront-migration-challenges\/","title":{"rendered":"Free movement in West Africa: three nations quitting Ecowas may confront migration challenges"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Franzisca Zanker*, Amanda Bisong*, & Leonie Jegen*<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, a recent decision to\u00a0withdraw<\/a>\u00a0from the\u00a0Economic Community of West African States<\/a>\u00a0(Ecowas) has thrown up questions about how they will navigate regional mobility in future.<\/p>\n

Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc\u2019s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a\u00a0shining example<\/a>\u00a0of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.<\/p>\n

As multidisciplinary scholars we have previously researched\u00a0migration governance in west Africa<\/a>, at the\u00a0regional level<\/a>, and in particular contexts like\u00a0Niger<\/a>.<\/p>\n

We argue that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from Ecowas curtails mobility. But it is likely that informal mobility will continue anyway.<\/p>\n

Why free movement matters<\/strong><\/h3>\n

In September 2023, the three countries created a\u00a0mutual defence pact<\/a>, named\u00a0the Alliance of Sahel States<\/a>. This indicated their solidarity in dealing with insecurity.<\/p>\n

Yet they also depend on neighbouring countries in the region, which puts these three countries in a difficult position.<\/p>\n

The three countries that announced their withdrawal from Ecowas are connected in a web of mobility. Notably, Niger, seen as a key transit country for refugees and other migrants on their way to Europe, received\u00a0major funds and support<\/a>\u00a0from the European Union to prevent onward migration to Libya and beyond.<\/p>\n

One central measure was\u00a0Loi 2015-36<\/a>, a law which punished people transporting migrants with fines and prison sentences. The law was\u00a0mostly developed<\/a>\u00a0by external actors and had detrimental effects on the\u00a0local economy<\/a>. It also made migration journeys across the Sahara desert even\u00a0more dangerous<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In November 2023, the law, which\u00a0arguably violated<\/a>\u00a0the principles of free movement under Ecowas, was repealed by the Nigerien coup leaders.<\/p>\n

Mali is another major transit country in the region, as well as a country of origin for regional migration. It has a complicated history of\u00a0migration cooperation<\/a>\u00a0with Europe.<\/p>\n

Of less relevance to Europe, but more for regional dynamics,\u00a0Burkina Faso<\/a>\u00a0is at the centre for\u00a0regional migration<\/a>, often seasonal. Labour migration supports C\u00f4te d’Ivoire\u2019s cocoa industry. After withdrawal from Ecowas, such labour migration may be difficult unless people resort more to informal migration.<\/p>\n

As we have shown in our\u00a0previous research<\/a>, informal mobility has always existed along with formal mobility governance. Official border crossing points are often not used, despite the legal requirement to do so.<\/p>\n

Hence, leaving Ecowas may increase corruption and\u00a0problems of harassment<\/a>\u00a0at formal border crossings as well as\u00a0increased use of mobility facilitators<\/a>, or \u201cpasseurs\u201d. These are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organise journeys through other routes.<\/p>\n

The legal gaps that the current situation creates could be very expensive for businesses and individuals. People may in the near future require visas. And for those who have migrated regionally, the right to stay in a country of residency may soon be under threat.<\/p>\n

An immediate exit<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Days after they\u00a0announced<\/a>\u00a0their withdrawal from\u00a0Ecowas<\/a>, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger\u00a0insisted<\/a>\u00a0they were not bound by\u00a0rules stipulating<\/a>\u00a0a one year notice period before their final exit.<\/p>\n

The announcement about leaving Ecowas outside the normal regulations was dramatic, but not unexpected. Military governments that took power in a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in\u00a0Mali<\/a>, September 2022 in\u00a0Burkina Faso<\/a>\u00a0and July 2023 in\u00a0Niger<\/a>\u00a0rule the three countries.<\/p>\n

Ecowas has exerted political and economic pressure on the three countries to return to constitutional rule, through sanctions and the\u00a0threat<\/a>\u00a0of military intervention.<\/p>\n

In Niger, for example, Ecowas\u00a0closed<\/a>\u00a0official border crossings, cut off more than\u00a070% <\/a>\u00a0of electricity, and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region.<\/p>\n

International assets\u00a0were frozen<\/a>\u00a0and international aid halted. Even before the coup,\u00a03.3 million people<\/a>\u00a0in Niger experienced acute food insecurity.<\/p>\n

The Ecowas sanctions made daily life even worse and in all likelihood added to the\u00a0popularity<\/a>\u00a0of the coup leaders.<\/p>\n

Similar sanctions were applied in Mali. The population has suffered as a result and the\u00a0effectiveness<\/a>\u00a0of the sanctions is questionable.<\/p>\n

Sanctions in Burkina Faso included\u00a0travel bans<\/a>\u00a0against members of the military government.<\/p>\n

Potential ways ahead<\/strong><\/h3>\n

For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, there are several considerations when it comes to regional mobility in their post-Ecowas era. These may include exploring the provisions of the\u00a0West African Economic and Monetary Union<\/a>; a return to bilateral agreements with individual neighbours; or relying on the\u00a0African Union Protocol on Free Movement<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Monetary union:<\/strong>\u00a0The three countries are still part of the\u00a0West African Economic and Monetary Union<\/a>\u00a0(Waemu), a union around the common currency, the CFA franc.<\/p>\n

The regional monetary union also has provisions for free movement of people and goods across its member countries. With this option, access to seaports, a major issue for all three landlocked countries, is ensured through other members of the monetary union, including, for example, Senegal.<\/p>\n

On the downside is the fact that a major argument for leaving Ecowas was the perceived role of external influence over the regional bloc. The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either. The union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France\u00a0continues<\/a>\u00a0to exert significant influence.<\/p>\n

Burkina Faso has already\u00a0announced<\/a>\u00a0its intention to leave the monetary union too.<\/p>\n

The West Africa Economic and Monetary Union also excludes major trading partners like Nigeria \u2013 of major importance to landlocked\u00a0Niger<\/a>\u00a0for food supplies. Trade and commerce between Nigeria and Niger provides a lifeline and is among the most intense areas of cross-border activity in west Africa.<\/p>\n

For these reasons, the regional monetary union option seems an unlikely alternative.<\/p>\n

Bilateral agreements:<\/strong>\u00a0Another option for the three countries could be a return to bilateral agreements with individual countries to facilitate free movement. This can be likened to what former Ecowas member\u00a0Mauritania<\/a>, which left in\u00a02000<\/a>, did.<\/p>\n

However, at the moment, given the sanctions, this option is off the cards, and could take many years to work out.<\/p>\n

African Union protocol:<\/strong>\u00a0At a continental level the\u00a0African Union Protocol on Free Movement<\/a>\u00a0may offer a distant way forward. So far only\u00a032 countries<\/a>\u00a0have signed it and four have ratified it, among them Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory).<\/p>\n

One way to move forward would be for countries to ramp up ratifications of this document, to ensure that cooperation on free movement can continue whatever happens to Ecowas.<\/p>\n

Of course, other countries within Ecowas could also unilaterally open up for visa-free entry like\u00a0Rwanda<\/a>\u00a0or Kenya have done, though the process has had its\u00a0hiccups<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Such visa arrangements are also unlikely to include the rights of residence and establishment guaranteed under the Ecowas framework.<\/p>\n

Given the current political context, an institutionalised option seems unlikely in the near future. The most likely option would be that migration will simply continue \u2013 informally.<\/p>\n

________________<\/p>\n

* Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute<\/em><\/p>\n

* PhD candidate, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam<\/em><\/p>\n

* PhD Candidate, University of Amsterdam<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc\u2019s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a\u00a0shining example\u00a0of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":9141,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"iawp_total_views":17,"jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"source_name":"The Conversation","source_url":"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/free-movement-in-west-africa-three-countries-leaving-ecowas-could-face-migration-hurdles-222826","via_name":"","via_url":"","override_template":"0","override":[{"template":"1","single_blog_custom":"","parallax":"1","fullscreen":"1","layout":"right-sidebar","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"top","share_float_style":"share-monocrhome","show_share_counter":"0","show_view_counter":"0","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author":"0","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_category":"0","show_post_reading_time":"0","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_prev_next_post":"0","show_popup_post":"0","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"0","show_post_related":"1","show_inline_post_related":"1"}],"override_image_size":"0","image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post":"0","trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post":"0","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","sponsored_post_name":"","sponsored_post_url":"","sponsored_post_logo_enable":"0","sponsored_post_logo":"","sponsored_post_desc":"","disable_ad":"0"},"jnews_primary_category":{"id":"","hide":""},"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":{"override_view_counter":"0","view_counter_number":"0","override_share_counter":"0","share_counter_number":"0","override_like_counter":"0","like_counter_number":"0","override_dislike_counter":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"footnotes":""},"categories":[1,37,27],"tags":[1626,208,1665,111,187,383,140,286],"class_list":["post-10932","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis-reports","category-ana-society","category-west-africa","tag-alliance-of-sahel-states","tag-burkina-faso","tag-economic-community-of-african-states-ecowas","tag-kenya","tag-mali","tag-niger","tag-rwanda","tag-sahel"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10932","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10932"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10932\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9141"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10932"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10932"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qiraatafrican.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10932"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}